Introduction
The hypothesis that an LTP-like process underlies memory formation has the great drawback that it is difficult to think of an experimental result that could definitively refute it. For every piece of evidence that appears to falsify the hypothesis, there is either another piece of evidence or a hand-waving argument that explains it away. To complicate matters further, even if the hypothesis were true, the evidence supporting it to date is so complex and contradictory that it would be difficult ever to convince a true sceptic of the fact. How, then, to arrive at a consensus one way or another?
This situation seems to exist because the memory systems are extremely complex, both anatomically and physiologically, and there are many possible paths of causality linking the very low level processes of synaptic change (if they exist) with the very high level processes of behaviour. Where we seem to run aground is in not really having a clear picture of what goes on in the middle. The purpose of this chapter is to look at what does go on in the middle, to see if it can help understand whether LTP does or does not mediate learning. The middle ground is the domain of the cognitive representation, the collective activity of neurons that maps the inputs of a structure onto the outputs, and the low-level processes onto the high level ones. In order to really understand how synaptic processes contribute to behaviour, we cannot ignore this representation.
Since the hippocampus has been the target of most studies in both LTP and memory research, the discussion to follow looks at one kind of cognitive representation that the hippocampus seems specialised for, the representation of space. The question to be asked is this: how is this representation put together, how is it modified by experience and what are the mechanisms of this modification?
The hippocampal cellular representation of space An enormous weight of evidence points to a role for the hippocampus in representing space and/or mediating spatial learning. It is outside the scope of this chapter to examine this evidence in detail, but useful discussions can be found in O' Keefe & Nadel, 1978, and Jarrard, 1993 . We shall also leave aside the contentious issue of whether the hippocampus also has some role in non-spatial cognition. If spatial memory forms at least part of its function, then that is enough for us to begin to tackle the question of how it does this, leaving until later the question of whether it does anything else besides.
One of the most convincing findings to support the spatial cognition hypothesis of hippocampal function came from the discovery by O'Keefe, in the early 1970s, that hippocampal principal cells show spatially localised firing (O'Keefe & Dostrovsky, 1971) . O'Keefe was recording single hippocampal cells from rats as they explored an environment, and found that the activity of one class of cell (complex spiking cells, presumed to be the pyramidal cells) showed a very high correlation with the location of the animal. O'Keefe named these cells place cells to reflect the high spatial specificity of their activity. An example of the receptive field (the place field) of a place cell is shown in Figure 1 A. In the example shown here, the cell indicated by the black squares was generally silent as the rat wandered over most of the environment (in this case, a square box) foraging for rice grains. However, whenever the rat walked into a particular part of the box (in this case the Northwest corner) the cell increased its firing rate markedly, reducing it to near-zero as the rat walked out of it again.
After ascertaining that these cells were not responding to any particular simple sensory feature in the environment, O'Keefe and Nadel proposed (O'Keefe & Nadel, 1978) that they were participating in a map-like representation of space (or what O'Keefe and Nadel called a "cognitive map," an expression coined by Tolman (1948) ). The finding of place cells was supported by emerging evidence from lesion studies that rats with damage to the hippocampus could not solve spatial tasks if these tasks seemed to require the use of some kind of mental map. It seemed, then, that the hippocampus might be some kind of spatial processor within the brain, whose function is to compute where the rat is so that it can navigate to some desirable goal. The grey stippled area shows the places where the rat walked during the 4 minutes of recording. Every time the place cell fired, a small black square was marked on the place where the rat was at the time. This particular cell fired whenever the rat was in the Northwest corner of the box, and was almost silent everywhere else. Right: the same data after smoothing and averaging, to show the contour plot representing the field. The peak firing rate of the cell is shown in the bottom right. B: The behaviour of 2 place cells in the O'Keefe and Burgess moving-walls experiment, showing how different place cells respond to different subsets of the environmental features. Cell 1 maintained its relationship to the South and West walls, while Cell 2 maintained its relationship with the North and West walls. Thus, when the distance between the North and South walls was increased, the fields of the cells were "pulled" apart.
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If place cells are participating in the hippocampal representation of space, then as the rat learns about its environment, one might expect to see this representation change in some way. Two broad classes of learning could be postulated a priori. First, when a rat enters a new environment, it may form an internal representation of the geometry and the salient landmarks, a kind of automatic learning that need not depend on any particular reward (other than the satisfaction of exploratory drive). Second, once it has found a goal (i.e., something in the environment that produces a reward), if the rat is to be able to get back there again it must add the location and nature of that goal into its mental map. These two functions together mean that in future, when the rat reenters the environment, it (a) recognises it, and (b) knows where the goal locations are within it. The two processes differ in that the initial mapping may be latent: that is, not visible to an observer, whereas the second process, goal learning, will be manifest as a subsequent tendency for the rat to go straight to the goal whenever it finds itself in that environment again. Most of the discussion in this chapter will be about latent learning, a kind of learning that is much more accessible to physiologists than to psychologists (who have to infer its existence from the way the animal's subsequent behaviour changes).
Plasticity
If place cells change their representation to incorporate new spatial knowledge, what kinds of changes would be observed? It is not enough merely to see experiencedependent changes in cellular activity, because such changes might occur during learning for reasons unrelated to memory formation per se. For example, while a neuron in the motor cortex might increase its firing during the course of a session in which a rat is learning to press a lever for food, this does not necessarily mean that the neuron is participating in that memory (though it might be). It may be just a reflection of the fact that the cortex is receiving an increased number of motor commands from somewhere upstream, where the memory is being formed. It is important to dissociate changes due to memory itself from changes due to the altered behavioural and emotional state of the animal.
What is memory, then, and how could it be observed at a cellular level? To a physiologist, memory is a meaningful change in a cognitive representation following experience, where the changes occur on the representing cells. By "meaningful" is meant that the changes are consistent with what might be expected given that we know what the animal experienced, and therefore how the cognitive representation ought to have changed. These changes correspond to what Lashley called the engram, or the memory trace. We now think, thanks to the insights of Konorski (1948) and Hebb (1949) , that the memory trace might consist of changes in connection strength between neurons resulting from their coactivity. As such, it could only be detectable by knowing the state of the neurons (including the strength of each input) before the learning event, and comparing that with what it became afterwards.
To understand memory, then, we need to understand What a set of neurons encodes,
What changes about the representation as a result of experience, How these changes occur, and
What the new representation encodes.
The hippocampal representation of space is an ideal candidate for this approach to the memory problem, since we now understand much about what its neurons encode. Having established (a), or at least part of (a), how do we go about moving through the remaining steps?
An associative approach to learning by place cells
The idea that memories are stored as changes in synaptic strength was first formalised by Hebb (1949) , who suggested that the changes should occur as a result of coactivity between the two connected cells, thus providing a mechanism for the association of activity patterns. If Hebb was right, then when a neural representation undergoes learning we would expect to see synaptic changes taking place between coactive neurons involved in this representation. This would have the effect that after learning, a given cell would receive a different pattern of inputs from what it had received before the learning.
To look for associative processes occurring in place cells, it is necessary to know the strengths of the inputs impinging on the cells before and after learning. This is not an easy matter, since it is still not feasible to record from single synapses in awake animals (hence the attractiveness of LTP as an experimental tool). However, one way around this problem is to measure not the physiological inputs, but the sensory inputs.
In other words, we can perform what amount to psychological experiments on the place cells by treating each cell as if it were itself a miniature animal, processing incoming stimuli and producing observable responses. Knowing how a place cell responds to a sensory input is not the same as knowing about its synapses − the sensory integration and plasticity may be taking place somewhere upstream from the cell (as we shall see later). However, it enables an assessment of how strongly a given cell is responding to an environmental stimulus, and therefore provides an indirect measure of the strength of a particular pathway between the sensory cortex and the cell. When learning takes place, then if the associativity hypothesis of memory is correct, one would expect to see this pathway change in strength. This is an important first step in localising the engram, and one which enables the testing of many hypotheses regarding memory formation, without recourse to the recording of synapses themselves.
This, then, is the strategy adopted in the experiments described below. The sequence of steps is as follows:
(a) First, identify the sensory inputs to a particular cell.
(b) Second, determine which are stronger and which are weaker.
(c) Third, change something about the sensory environment in a way that would predictably force learning to occur.
(d) Fourth, reassess the relative input strengths. Have they changed? More importantly, have they changed in a way that accords with what happened in (c)?
Identify the inputs onto place cells and assess their relative strengths
What are the sensory inputs onto place cells? In other words, how does a place cell know where the rat is?
The most obvious explanation is that perhaps each cell responds to a simple sensory characteristic of the environment, such as a localised odour, and only fires when that sensory stimulus is present. A large body of evidence now exists to show that this is not the case. One of the simplest demonstrations was provided by O' Keefe and Burgess (1996) who recorded place cells in boxes of varying sizes and shapes. The walls of the boxes were constructed out of the same four pieces of wood, clamped together in different ways so that in any given recording session a given wall could be North, South, East or West and either short or long. The paper covering the floor was also changed periodically. O'Keefe and Burgess found that provided the shape and size of the box was the same, a place cell would always fire in the same place in the box regardless of the arrangement of the walls and floor paper, even if the box were moved around within the room (within certain limits). Thus, the firing of a place cell could only be explained by a combination of sensory features plus some kind of spatial information (such as direction and distance; see below). O'Keefe and Burgess then altered the size and shape of the box by moving some of the walls with respect to the others. They found that somewhat surprisingly, different place cells responded in different ways to this manoeuvre. Some cells retained their relationship to some walls, and some to others. Other cells stopped firing, or began firing when they had been silent previously. An illustration of such a change is found in Figure 1 B. This finding has been corroborated by others (e.g., and it now appears that when a change is made to an environment, each place cell acts as if it only knows about a subset of the features in the environment, and is oblivious to the remainder. This is an important finding as it suggests that a single place cell cannot code for the location of the rat by itself. Only the combined activity of several or many cells can represent the location of the rat uniquely. O'Keefe and Burgess proposed a model in which each place cell fires maximally when the rat is within a certain distance of a subset of the walls of the box.
The walls that a given place cell responds to will henceforth be referred to as its proximal inputs. The proximal inputs to a place cell must be strong, because the box as a whole can usually be moved around over small distances within a room and the fields will follow it around. However, if a box is moved a large enough distance from one part of a room to another, some cells respond to this change by altering or abolishing their fields when the box is in one location, but not when it is in another, as discussed later. This shows that at least some place cells receive information from regions of the environment outside the box. These inputs will henceforth be called the distal inputs. The inputs supplied to a place cell by extended surfaces such as walls will be called the cell's geometric inputs.
Place cells also seem to make use of non-geometric information. For example, Muller and his colleagues have shown that moving a rat from a cylindrical environment of one colour to an identically shaped cylinder of a different colour causes place cells to change their fields ( Bostock et al, 1991; Kentros et al, 1998) . Thus, although the location of a given place field depends on the geometry of the environment, the nongeometric features sometimes seem able to tell the cell whether or not to fire in that location. This leads to the intriguing possibility that the non-geometric inputs gate the geometric inputs, telling the place cell which set of inputs to respond to in a given environment. We will return to this possibility later.
What happens in an environment that conveys ambiguous geometric information? For example, in a square environment such as that of O' Keefe and Burgess (1996) , where the walls were interchanged, a place cell that is predisposed to fire in a particular geometric location (say, for example, 6 cm from one wall and 20 cm from the adjacent wall) has 4 possible firing locations. How does it know which one to choose, if the walls are all identical? As well as the geometric and non-geometric inputs, a place cell clearly must have some additional information about the location of the rat. One possibility is that the cells can distinguish the walls on the basis of their direction.
We tested this hypothesis in an experiment in which the rat was misled into thinking that North lay in some other direction (East, South or West: Jeffery, 1998; Jeffery & O'Keefe, 1999) . Place cells were recorded as the rat foraged for rice grains in a square box contained within a circular curtained environment. Because of the visual symmetry of both the box and its surround, the only visible directional cue was a large white card, lit by a spotlight and hanging just in front of the curtains, aligned with one of the 4 walls of the box. Before some trials, the rat was hidden under an opaque cover and then the card moved to a new location behind one of the other box walls. When the rat was released and allowed to forage again, the place fields were consistently found also to have rotated, so that they had the same relationship to the cue card as before.
This control by a cue card over place fields has been previously described by several investigators (O'Keefe & Conway, 1980; Knierim et al, 1995; Rotenberg & Muller, 1997; Hetherington & Shapiro, 1997) and is well established. It shows that place cells have visual directional inputs. In other words, although the actual location of the fields within the box (the x-y co-ordinates, so to speak) is governed by the geometric cues supplied by the box walls, the choice of which walls to use (i.e., which is to be "x" and which "y") is governed by the visual cues, either on the walls of the box or outside the box altogether (but not, interestingly, inside it: Cressant et al, 1997) which seem to act like a compass.
What happens when there is no visual directional information available? In the above apparatus, the cue card was removed and place cells recorded again. The results for a typical cell are shown in Figure 2 A. The first thing to notice is that the field was still localised to a single location within the box: that is, its pattern did not possess fourfold symmetry, even though the environment itself now did. The cell must therefore still have had some directional information available. This time, when the rat was enclosed under the opaque cover, the rat itself was rotated (by rotating the piece of box floor that it was standing on) for some multiple of 90 degrees, at a very slow rate that was intended to be undetectable to it. When the rat was released and allowed to forage again, the place field was found to have rotated by the same amount as the rat. This pattern was observed in all four rats tested, and it suggests that the directional information was somehow contained within the rats, and carried along with them.
There is now considerable evidence that some kind of directional information can indeed be "contained within" an animal, in the sense of being independent of external landmarks (though not independent of external sensory information per se). This idiothetic information, which derives from the movements of the animal, is synthesised (Blair & Sharp, 1996) from a mixture of vestibular and proprioceptive information, optic flow (which provides information about movement even if there are no landmarks present) and also probably motor commands (motor efference copy: Taube et al, 1996) . The rotation of place fields with rotation of the rat shows that place cells have access to idiothetic directional information when visual directional cues are unavailable. However, recall that when the cue card was present, place fields tended to follow its movements even though these conflicted with the rat's idiothetic cues. It thus appears (at least in this experiment) that when there are both visual and idiothetic directional cues present, place cells prefer the visual inputs (Figure 2 
B).
Figure 2 − A: The effect of idiothetic cues on the orientation of a place field. Left box: before rotation of the rat, this field lay in the Northeast corner of the box. The rat was then confined under an opaque cover to the circular platter comprising the centre of the box floor. This platter was then slowly rotated 180 degrees, and the rat released and allowed to forage again. Right box: now the place field was found in the Southwest corner of the box, suggesting that its orientation with the otherwise symmetrical box was influenced not by external cues, but rather by cues contained within the rat and rotated along with it. B: When the procedure in A was repeated in the presence of a cue card (shown by the white rectangle), which was rotated by a different amount, the field rotated with the cue card and not with the rat's idiothetic cues. This suggests that the visual directional inputs to this cell were stronger than the idiothetic inputs.
Putting all this information together, the following input hierarchy emerges. A place cell recorded from a rat in a box within a larger room (which is the arrangement in most experiments) receives several geometric inputs, from two or more of the walls of the box (proximal inputs) and from features in the room outside the box (distal inputs). It also receives non-geometric inputs (such as odours, colours and textures), from the box and presumably from the room, and it receives two kinds of directional input, visual and idiothetic, that tell it which way the box is oriented. There are other possible sources of information that are less well established but nevertheless likely to play a part. For example, idiothetic cues may supply not only directional information but also information about the rat's linear movements. When combined with the directional information, the brain could, in theory, use these motion cues to compute the whereabouts of the rat, even in the absence of external landmarks. This movement-based tracking of location is known as path integration ( Mittelstaedt, 1982) , or dead reckoning, and it may play a part in localising place fields under situations in which other types of information are unavailable .
These various types of input can be approximately ranked in order of relative strength, although the picture is far from complete. It appears that the proximal geometric inputs are very strong, possibly stronger than the distal inputs if the environment is relatively unfamiliar (for reasons we will come to later). Among the proximal inputs, some are stronger than others for a given cell, as evidenced from O'Keefe and Burgess's experiment where the walls were pulled apart. Within the directional inputs, the visual inputs appear to be stronger that the idiothetic inputs, at least in some situations.
The finding that there is a hierarchy of input strengths among the inputs onto place cells opens the door to experiments that attempt to manipulate these inputs, provoking a re-ordering of the hierarchy − a simple form of learning. The next section describes the results of two such experiments.
Change the sensory environment so as to force learning, and reassess the input strengths
Experiment 1: The directional inputs
This experiment began with the observation that in our apparatus, visual directional inputs appear to be stronger than the idiothetic ones, as discussed earlier.
The intention was to manipulate the inputs so as to make the strong input relatively weaker and the weak one relatively stronger. We reasoned that one situation under which this might occur is if the visual cue were mobile, and therefore unsuitable to act as a spatial landmark. It seems not unreasonable that the spatial system in the hippocampus (or near it) should have evolved a mechanism to rapidly disconnect mobile objects from its representation ( Knierim et al, 1995; Biegler & Morris, 1996) .
The apparatus was that used in the directional experiments described above: a square box, located inside a circular curtained arena in which a white cue card supplied a strong, visual directional signal. The relative strengths of the visual and idiothetic directional inputs onto place cells were tested each day by "conflict" trials in which the rat was enclosed under a cover on the rotating part of the box floor. For each of these trials, the rat was slowly rotated by a multiple of 90° and the card moved by a different multiple of 90°, thereby dissociating the visual and idiothetic cues. Place fields were then recorded to see if they had rotated with the card or the rat, thus revealing their preferred directional input.
The learning phase of this experiment took place in the trials preceding these test trials. For some rats, the cue card was visibly moved before each trial. This was achieved by unhooking the card from the curtain rail from which it was suspended, carrying it (in full view of the rat) to a different location behind one of the other walls of the box, and then re-hanging it. The rat was therefore able to see that the card was mobile. According to the disconnection hypothesis, these rats should experience a weakening of the influence of the card over their place fields. The remaining four rats, which had been covered during movement of the card, were never given an opportunity to see the card move and should, according to the hypothesis, experience no change in the relative influence of the cue card on the orientation of their fields. Figure 3 shows the results of the test trials, in which the relative strengths of the visual and idiothetic inputs were compared. In rats that had previously seen the card move, the fields gradually stopped following the card and started rotating with the rats' idiothetic cues instead. Place fields in the other rats followed the cue card on all test trials, regardless of the rotation of the rat and its idiothetic cues. Thus, allowing rats to see that a directional indicator was mobile resulted in a weakening of this input, and a strengthening of the previously weaker idiothetic inputs.
Figure 3 − Results of trials in which the rat was covered and slowly rotated by one amount, while the card was rotated by a different amount. The left graph shows the percentage of trials in which the fields, after release of the rat, were found to have followed the card. The right graph shows the percentage of trials in which they were found to have followed the rat. The behaviour of the fields differed depending on whether the rats had previously seen that the card was mobile. In rats that had seen the card move, the fields stopped following the card and started rotating by the same amount as the rat had been rotated, suggesting an increasing influence of the idiothetic cues with time. In rats that never saw the card move, the fields reliably continued to follow it.
Two rats from the group that had never seen the card move were subjected to further testing (Jeffery, 1998) . First, they underwent several days of recording where, after the test trials, the idiothetic cues were tested in isolation. The results from this phase of testing showed that despite the card's superior control when it was present, the idiothetic cues were still able to influence place fields in the absence of competition. Then the rats underwent 5 days during which, after testing, the card was moved visibly. In these rats, the cue card continued to influence place fields reliably despite the fact that the rats could now see it move. This rather surprising finding seems to indicate that once the cue card had exerted control over place field orientation for some time, the place cells continued to "trust" it even despite its manifest unreliability. This suggests that during the first phases of the experiment, when no learning appeared to be going on, an already strong input was in fact getting even stronger. 
Session % trials followed rat
Rats that saw the card move (n = 4) Rats that never saw the card move (n = 4) How did the place cells "know" that the visual cue was mobile? There seem to be two possibilities. First, perhaps the card activated visual motion-detectors that alerted some part of the brain (such as the object recognition system) to that cue's unreliability. The system could then tag its representation for that object as "mobile" or "unreliable" and pass on its tagged output as a weakened input to the spatial system. Note that this is a process that would not necessarily evoke any kind of associative or Hebbian process (in other words, no coactivity need have occurred). On the other hand, Knierim et al. (1995) have suggested that a mobile cue might be recognised as mobile not because of motion detection per se, but because the spatial system recognises that information about its location repeatedly conflicts with idiothetic information. For example, if the idiothetic system tells the rat's hippocampus that the rat is not moving, but the cue changes its location relative to the rat, then the cue itself must be moving. Thus, the idiothetic and the visual systems may compare information to help decide whether an external sensory stimulus is moving or not. This process, if it occurs, could well be associative.
We found that in trials where the rat was rotated by one amount and the card by a different amount, this resulting conflict did not appear to weaken the visual cue at all, provided the rat had never seen the card moving. This seems to suggest that Knierim et al. were wrong in their supposition, and that it was the experience of seeing the card move that caused the place cells to shift their allegiance. However, there is one other important difference between the rats that saw the card move and those that didn't, and that is that the latter group were isolated under an opaque cover for between 2 and 4 minutes while the card was being moved. Could it be that this visual (and motor) deprivation weakened the idiothetic cues, causing the fields to continue to follow the card even though it was mobile?
We tested this hypothesis by recording place cells from a third group of four rats who never saw the card move but for whom the period of enclosure under the cover was made a brief as possible (30 s only, which is the time it took to move the card). If the critical factor was whether the rats perceived the motion of the card visually, then this group, still deprived of such information, should behave no differently from the rats that were enclosed for 2-4 minutes. It turned out, however, that this group's behaviour was mid-way between that of the other groups − fields in two rats behaved like those in rats that had never seen the card move (always following the card) and those in the other two behaved like rats that had seen it move (their fields stopped following the card and started following the rat). Since these rats hadn't seen the card move either, this suggests that perhaps it was not the movement of the card per se that was the crucial factor, so much as the amount of time that the rat was unable to move around and see its environment. Perhaps the isolation of the rat caused the idiothetic cues to weaken. If this were the case, it follows that perhaps if the card could be moved instantaneously, then even if the rats didn't actually see the card move, their fields might nevertheless stop following the card too.
The above explanation, though complex, is not implausible because it is likely that the idiothetic direction sense needs a constant supply of visual information to keep it updated. If this information is withheld, as it is when the rat is incarcerated under its opaque cover, then perhaps the idiothetic cues get weaker. This might be why the card always "wins" in such competitions. However, if the card is moved when the rat is uncovered, then the full-strength idiothetic system can perhaps compete successfully with the visual cue. It is just a short step from there to positing that such repeated disjunctions could cause the visual cue to be weakened, by a Hebbian (or rather antiHebbian) mechanism such as LTD.
In summary, then, the findings of this experiment show that directional inputs onto place cells can be rearranged in strength following a learning experience. The nature of this rearrangement seems consistent with the nature of the information being learned: that is, a strong (visual) input became relatively weaker when it was made an unreliable indicator of direction, a weak (idiothetic) input became stronger, and a strong input seemed to become even stronger when it had been experienced as reliable for some time. Thus, the change in the cognitive representation accords with what one would expect of a memory trace. Does this mean that the place cells themselves learned about the spatial cues? Is the engram for directional landmark stability contained within them?
The answer for this particular experiment is probably "no". It was mentioned earlier that to consider a cell to be part of a memory trace, it is necessary to know that the change in its behaviour originates from changes in that cell itself. While the place cells in this experiment certainly experienced a change in the strength of environmental inputs, there is reason to think that the inputs did not change on the place cells themselves. This reason is that when learning was occurring (in the rats that were seeing the cue card move around) the place cells always changed their firing patterns together. When one cell stopped rotating with the cue card and started rotating with the rat, all simultaneously recorded cells did so in unison. On no occasion was it ever observed that one cell rotated its field with the cue card while, at the same time, another cell rotated with the rat's idiothetic cues. This would be surprising if the input rearrangement was happening on place cell synapses, since one would expect (for purely statistical reasons) that some cells would learn faster than others. Instead, this observation strongly suggests that the learning was taking place elsewhere and that an integrated, coherent signal was being passed onto the place cells. There are several brain regions, such as the postsubiculum (Taube et al, 1990b; Taube et al, 1990a) , thalamus (Taube, 1995) and other structures (Chen et al, 1994a; Chen et al, 1994b ) that process directional information directly and express their computation in the form of the activity of head direction cells. The firing of these cells is highly correlated with the direction that the rat's head is pointing in at a given moment, and we also know that brain regions containing head direction cells do communicate with the hippocampus (albeit indirectly). It thus seems likely that the learning revealed in this experiment was taking place in one of the head direction areas. A discussion of how and where this integration may be achieved can be found in Taube et al. (1996) . Two conclusions about learning can be drawn from this experiment. First, learning can be observed at a cellular level by exposing an animal to a change in its environment and recording a change in the way the cells behave subsequently. If this change makes sense in the context of what we know the cells are representing (and in this case it does) then it seems likely that what is observed is learning itself, and not a by-product of it − even though it was never expressed as a change in the overt behaviour of the animal. "Likely" does not mean "proven," however. Second, it is not enough merely to observe such a change. It is necessary to know also that the change was localised to those cells themselves. In this case, there are strong grounds for thinking this not to be the case.
Experiment 2: The geometric inputs
The second experiment examined another pair of place cell inputs in which there appears to be a difference in input strengths: the proximal and distal inputs. Recall that the proximal inputs generally seem to be very much stronger, as evidenced by the observation that moving a box around within a room causes fields to shift along with the box, rather than remaining attached to the room. We tested whether these relative strengths could be varied by creating a conflict between them (that is, by moving the proximal cues with respect to the distal cues). In other words, could a place cell be forced to learn over time that the proximal and distal cues did not always coincide, and modify their representation accordingly?
Three rats participated in this experiment. The apparatus used was a 72 cm square box, which lacked a floor so that the rat walked around on paper taped to the floor of the room. Since this paper was fixed throughout all the trials on each day (though changed each day), the floor effectively constituted one of the "static" cues. The box, which was 25 cm high, was located inside the curtained-off arena described in the previous experiment, so that the rat, if it looked up, could see only the curtains and the ceiling. This was done so as to minimise the salience of the distal cues and slow down learning enough for it to be measured on a day-by-day basis. To provide a weak directional cue, a spotlight was shone on the north side of the curtains so that there was a gradient of illumination across the environment from north to south. For one rat, a cue card was also present, to enable rotation of the direction sense (by the covering procedure described above) and therefore disconnection from the static olfactory cues in the arena. The lighting, in conjunction with the rat's idiothetic direction sense, was intended to keep the rat directionally oriented while the nondirectional aspects of the environment changed.
Place cells were recorded as the proximal and distal cues were dissociated by moving the box back and forth between two locations that overlapped slightly. The rat remained within the box enclosure during the moving of the box so that no disruption to its path integration system was introduced. The question asked in this experiment was: did the box-moving procedure cause place cells to alter the relative pattern of inputs from the two sources of information? Each session consisted of 4 pairs of trials, alternating between the two locations, so that any changes seen could be checked for stability .
Fifty-four cells were analysed in detail, of which 6 had variable fields and were therefore excluded. At first, moving the box back and forth between the two locations did not appear to affect the place cell representation much, if at all. The majority of cells shifted their fields along with the box and did not appear to "notice" that the pattern of distal cues was different in the two locations. Over time, however, more and more cells began to differentiate the two locations, behaving differently in one box location than the other. Cells that showed different behaviour in the two box locations were called discriminating cells and those that had the same field in both places were called non-discriminating. In total, 20 cells were discriminating and 28 were non-discriminating. Figure 4 A shows an example of three cells, one of which did not discriminate (cell 1) and two which fired only when the box was in the NW location (cell 2) or the SE location (cell 3).
The proportions of discriminating and non-discriminating cells did not, however, remain constant over time. Figure 4 B shows that over the course of several sessions, the proportion of non-discriminating cells decreased and the proportion of discriminating cells increased. A Chi-square analysis comparing the first two sessions with the last two sessions showed a significant change in the proportions of discriminating vs. non-discriminating cells (χ 2 = 6.30, df = 1, p < 0.05). Usually a discriminating cell possessed a field only in one or other location, but occasionally a cell demonstrated a different field in one of the two locations. On one occasion, a cell was observed to change from non-discriminating to discriminating behaviour, suggesting that individual cells might be able to change their behaviour. How did the cells discriminate the two locations? One possibility is that they were able to use information generated by the movement of the rat (path integration) as it walked from location NW to location SE, when the box was moved. The other possibility is that they were able to use information from distal cues as the primary discriminative stimulus. We attempted to discriminate these two possibilities in a fourth animal. For this rat, the visually identical environments were adjacent, both constructed out of pieces of grey laminated wood, 60 cm square, that were rearranged between trials or between sessions. The pieces were arranged so as to form adjacent rectangular enclosures, a West box and an East box, which were 120 cm long x 60 cm wide and which shared one of the long walls. The floor was covered with white paper which was rotated, inverted or changed completely at the start of each day. When the rat was required to move under its own volition from one box to the other, one of the pieces of wood forming the dividing wall was pulled back to open up a gap in the centre of the wall. After the rat had passed through, this gap was closed up again. Because the outside walls of the box also had a join in the centre, closure of the gap meant that the East and West boxes became visually identical. The electrodes remained stable in the CA1 cell layer for several weeks, and 94 complex spiking cells were isolated, of which 46 had stable place fields and proceeded to further analysis. Of these, 26 discriminated the 2 environments and 20 did not. Of the cells that discriminated the environments, 14 lost a field in one or other box and 12 developed a different field. As in the previous experiment, however, the relative proportions of discriminating and non-discriminating cells did not remain constant over time. showing that one cell did not discriminate (fired in the same relative place in both boxes) and two discriminated, firing only in the East box. C: When the box ensemble (including the floor paper) was moved Eastwards, so that the West box lay in the place within the room previously occupied by the East box, the cells adopted the "East" firing pattern, even though the rat had just walked there from the East box (now in a "Far-East" location). This suggests that it was the location of the box within the room, and not either a sensory characteristic of the box, nor the relative locations of the East and West boxes, that told the cells which firing pattern to exhibit.
In the first block of 6 sessions, only 1 of the 6 cells had discriminated the two boxes, and this was only observed on the final day of the block. At the end of this block, the partition between the boxes was opened up to let the rat walk through from the East box to the West. It was predicted that there would be a sudden change in the place cell representation as the rat discovered that there were, in reality, 2 boxes. This, however, did not happen: there was no change in the pattern of fields in the two boxes (not shown).
For the remainder of the experiment, the rat passed from one box to the other by walking through the gap in the partition, when this was made available. As the days progressed, the proportion of cells showing discriminating behaviour changed so that eventually more cells became discriminating than not (Figure 5 A) . Thus, as before, there appeared to be an effect of time on the proportion of cells that fell into each category. A Chi-square analysis comparing the first 2 blocks with the last 2 blocks showed a significant change in the proportions of discriminating vs. nondiscriminating cells (χ 2 = 11.31, df = 1, p < 0.001). What information did the discriminating cells use to know what firing pattern to adopt? Three possibilities seemed likely candidates. First, perhaps the cells used path integration information − in other words, because the rat had the opportunity to walk from one box to the other, perhaps the cells were able to combine this motion information along with sensory information to determine which box was which. Second, perhaps the East box possessed different sensory characteristics (such as odour) from the West box. Third, perhaps the cells could use the slightly different view of the room from the two boxes to distinguish the two − for example, the computer was nearer to the East box, and the door nearer to the West box. These possibilities were tested by means of probe trials. First, the rat was removed from the environment while the whole box ensemble (the two boxes and the floor paper) were shifted East so that the West box now lay in the position (with respect to the room) formerly occupied by the East box. The rat was then replaced in the West box, and a trial of place cell recording conducted. Then the rat was allowed to walk through to the East box (now in a Far East position). Recording of place fields was not possible from this box as it lay outside the camera viewing area: however, the rat was encouraged to explore this box as usual, and then allowed back into the West box. It was predicted that if path integration were the major determinant in these cells, then at least after the rat's return (if not before) they should fire in the West pattern in the West box, regardless of its location in the room. Similarly, if olfactory information emanating from the box and the floor paper were the determining factors then the cells should also fire in their "West pattern". However, if cues outside the box were the determining factors, then the cells should fire in the "East pattern," even though the rat was in the West half of the box ensemble.
The results of this procedure were examined for 14 discriminating cells. For the first trial, before the rat had passed into the East box (in the far-East location), 10 of the cells fired in the "East" pattern and only 1 cell fired in the "West" pattern, seeming to rule out olfaction as an important discriminative stimulus. For the second trial, after the rat had passed into the East box and returned to the West box again, 7 of the cells fired in the "East" pattern and none fired in the "West" pattern. Figure 5 B shows a typical result from such a manipulation: the cells fired in the East pattern when the box was shifted eastwards, even though the rat was in the West box and even after it had moved into the East box and back again. Thus, it appears that for this rat, the distal room cues were the major discriminative stimulus for these cells. The decline in cells firing in the "East" pattern after the rat had walked through to the other box and back might suggest a disruptive influence of path integration on the integrity of the fields. Nevertheless, the cells did not assume a "West" pattern despite this influence.
In fact, at no time was a "relative West" cell ever observed: that is, a cell firing in the West of the two boxes, regardless of its position in the room. It seems, therefore, that path integration alone could not support the discrimination between the boxes, and suggests that the distal cues were a primary source of discriminative information.
The development of a new pattern of place cell activity in an environment is usually called remapping, to reflect the belief that it constitutes development of a new representation (map) of the environment. The remapping seen in the identical-box experiments discussed here is unusual because it is an example of what might be called piecemeal remapping − in other words, the change happened one cell at a time.
The existence of piecemeal (as contrasted with all-or-nothing) remapping casts some light on how place cells construct and modify their representations. Since the two box locations differed only with respect to their location in the outside room, cells that discriminated the locations seem to have done so by using information from these cues. Assuming that the discrimination was acquired by individual cells (though this was only actually observed directly on one occasion), it seems that the effective input from the distal cues must have become stronger over time. Furthermore, the proximal inputs must have become effectively weaker at the same time. If they had not, then they would still have been able to drive the cells to firing threshold in both box locations, just as they had done previously. That the discriminating cells usually stopped firing in one or other box location shows that for these cells, the correct configuration of proximal cues was no longer enough to make them fire. Now, the cells appeared to need a conjunction of both the correct proximal and the correct distal cues. Figure 6 depicts a scheme showing the apparent change in inputs onto these cells over time.
Figure 6 − Change in inputs strengths onto place cells after experience in a cue conflict situation. The floorless box was moved diagonally between the two locations shown. Left: initially, this cell had the same fields in both location, showing that it must have been driven strongly from the proximal cues (the box walls: shown by the thick lines). However, this model postulates that there is also a weak input onto some of the cells from the distal cues (the curtains: shown by the thin lines). Right: after time, the cell stopped firing in the Southeast box location. This shows that the proximal cues must have become relatively weaker, otherwise they should still be able to drive the cell to its firing threshold in either location. However, the distal cues became stronger, so that the cell can only fire when it receives a conjunction of both distal and proximal inputs. Therefore, it has become able to discriminate the two locations.
These changes might reflect an associative redistribution of input strengths. Because the proximal cues and distal cues were paired, the distal inputs might have become strengthened because of the coactivity with the firing cell, as it was being driven by the (initially strong) proximal inputs. However, there are alternative, non-associative explanations for the changes in input strength. Perhaps the distal inputs increased in strength because as time passed, the rat began to pay more "attention" to its surroundings, this attention being manifest neurophysiologically as an increase in activity along this pathway (the synaptic weights themselves perhaps remaining
Initially
After experience unchanged). Place cells receiving a relatively larger percentage of their inputs from the distal cues would tend to reflect this increase first, explaining the piecemeal nature of the change. Perhaps the proximal inputs became relatively weaker because the cell raised its firing threshold to compensate for the increased drive it was receiving. Perhaps the distal inputs were able to inhibit the proximal ones by some feedforward process.
Whether the mechanism is associative or not, it seems clear that the pattern of inputs onto these cells was able to change in a meaningful way as a result of the rat's experience. In other words, the development of discriminatory ability by place cells seems to reflect the acquisition by the spatial map of useful knowledge about the environment, and might reasonably correspond to or even underlie the ability of the rat as a whole to make such discriminations.
As well as shedding light on the processes of memory formation, the finding that subclasses of inputs can be dissociated by changing parts of the environment opens up the possibility of experiments looking at how place cells integrate the various sources of information impinging on them. For example, the observation that a small proportion of cells, rather than losing a field, developed a different field in one or other of the boxes shows that at any one time, a given cell might have two or even more simultaneous sets of inputs, of which it only selects one at a given moment. It must have the proximal inputs to know where in the box to fire (and a control experiment, not shown here, found that moving the box a small amount caused the fields to follow along with it, so there must have been some proximal drive onto the cell). Similarly, it must have the distal inputs, or else it would not know which set of proximal inputs to respond to.
How might these various combinations of inputs be processed by the cells? One possibility is that the inputs are simply additive, so that the combination of a proximal cue and its associated distal cue are strong enough to push the cell past its firing threshold, whereas the individual cues are not. By this line of reasoning, the cell should not care which proximal cue is paired with which distal cue, so long as the combination is strong enough. However, preliminary data suggest this may not be the case. In an informal test of this hypothesis the box was shifted to a novel location, not previously experienced by the rat, in which one set of proximal cues was paired with the opposite set of distal cues. It was predicted that the cell should fire in the appropriate location within the box specified by the proximal cues because of supporting drive from the distal cues, even though this particular combination of proximal and distal cues had never occurred together before. Somewhat surprisingly, no such thing happened: instead, the pattern of fields was the same as that in one of the previously experienced locations (as it happens, the one most recently experienced by the rat, which may or may not be significant). In other words, it seems as though, at least in this example, the cell did not respond to a simple combination of inputs: rather, it seemed to know which sets of inputs belonged together.
How could this be achieved? There are various possibilities, but perhaps the most interesting is that the distal cues might gate the proximal cues: that is, enable the cell to select, from among its various sets of proximal inputs, which ones to respond to and which to ignore at a given time. In this scenario, the strength of the proximal input would be modulated by whether or not its corresponding distal input is active. If it is, then the proximal input will be strong enough to drive the cell: if not, then it will not. In other words, the pattern of inputs onto a place cell is arranged in such a way that certain combinations belong together and that the presence of only parts of a given combination will not affect the cell.
Such a gating arrangement is not entirely implausible: as mentioned earlier, it has been known for some time that the presence of non-spatial inputs (such as the colour of the environment) can determine which set of spatial inputs are selected by the cell. The possibility that a subclass of spatial input might act in the same way is intriguing. It might explain, for example, why rats that have learned a given proximal environment (such as a watermaze) might be able subsequently to learn a spatial goal whose whereabouts is signalled by the distal cues, even under conditions, such as NMDA blockade, where spatial learning had been presumed impossible (Bannerman et al, 1995) . It also suggests that the ability of the hippocampus to learn about context (corresponding in our example to the distal environment) might be experimentally dissociable from its spatial learning capability.
The main conclusion from the shifting-box experiment is that spatial inputs can be manipulated independently, so as to investigate the relative influences on the place cell. Furthermore, it appears that the pattern of input strengths can be modulated by experience, just as with the directional inputs. This rearrangement is consistent with what we know about what the rat as a whole should be learning: in other words, the place cells are "learning" to discriminate the two locations, just as the rat might be (though this was not tested explicitly).
Does this constitute true learning? Much more experimentation is needed to determine if this is the case. To begin with, it is far from clear where in the brain these changes are taking place. Maybe the increase in distal input strength is due to an increase of the synaptic strength onto place cells: however, it could equally well be due to increased activity on the input pathway as a result of increased attention by the rat to the distal cues. Although such an attentional change arguably constitutes a kind of memory (because it comes about as a result of experience), it is non-associative and likely to be extra-hippocampal. Until the exact anatomical nature and location of changes such as these have been identified, it will not be possible to conclude firmly that the site of the engram has been localised. Nevertheless, the results suggest that the study of latent learning by cognitive representations provides a worthwhile ground for future research.
Conclusion
One of the findings that is gradually emerging from both current and past research is that "memory" is in reality a multitude of processes, perhaps a different process in every brain system. For example, is the attentional change that we speculated about above a type of memory? What about path integration ("memory" for recent movements)? What about the downregulation of AMPA receptors as a result of overactivity in a pathway? Or a change in a cell's firing threshold?
Rather than "memory", it is perhaps preferable to be more explicit about one's meaning and to talk, for example, about cognitive representations and how they are constructed, how they change as a result of experience, and whether the changed representation overwrites the original, or is somehow stored alongside it. To this end, the spatial cognitive system is one of the most interesting and useful areas for study, as so much is known both about its anatomical organisation and physiology.
The theme of this book is LTP, and whether it is a mechanism for "memory." The purpose of the present chapter was to show that what goes on within the spatial cognitive representation when an animal is exposed to a new environment (and so learns about it) is multifarious and complex. It is likely that there are many processes, some that are obviously manifest as a change in the output of the rat (its behaviour) and some, like latent learning of directional or distal cues, that may change the cognitive representation inside the rat even if never observed by an experimenter. To understand spatial learning, then, and to explore its physiological basis, we need to know much more about what actually goes on in the cells themselves as they acquire new information about the world. It seems likely that by the time we have isolated these changes to our satisfaction, the question of whether the processes are LTP, or even something vaguely like it, will have evolved to become the far more interesting question of how each system modifies its own particular representation. There are probably many different processes, occurring in different parts of the brain both within and without the hippocampal formation, and some of them probably resemble LTP to a greater or lesser degree (with, for example, dependence on the NMDA receptor) while others probably do not.
Should we give up studying LTP altogether then? The answer is obviously "no", since the LTP model of synaptic change has been enormously useful in unravelling the machinery of the synapses, and likely will be for some time to come. However, it is worth remembering that LTP is simply an artificial way of persuading synapses to alter their strengths. Whether and to what extent the changes that mediate LTP also play a part in spatial learning is in some senses a naïve question, given the tangled web of complexity behind what looks deceptively like a simple behavioural function. Rather than speculate too long about the extent to which nature imitates "art," (if LTP induction can be considered an art, which is often the case) it surely makes more sense to look at nature herself, and ask her directly how she does what she does.
